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INTRODUCTION 
Bureaucracy. The t e rm is laden with negative connotations. One t h n k s  of 
large, rigidified organizations with baroque, ritualized procedures incapable of 
adapting to changing needs and conditions in the environment. In mentioning 
the term bureaucracy one usually also speaks of its means of perpetuation: the 
professional bureaucrat.  These are usually cast as unimaginative, plodding indi- 
viduals socialized into the rule system of the bureaucracy to the point where the 
rules themselves, and not the  purposes behlnd the rules, become the reason and 
guides of their employ. In recent years, another force has appeared which 
threatens to spread, the phenomenon of bureaucracy even further;  namely the 
implementation of these bureaucratic rules and procedures in the form of 
computer-based administrative systems. 
The purpose of t h s  paper is to review in somewhat more depth the nature 
and interaction of these three forces: the bureaucratic organization itself; the 
bureaucrats that populate such organizations; and the special impact of infor- 
mation technology on their operation. 
BIIREAUCR4TIC ORGANIZATIONS 
The t e r m  "bureaucracy," as both a popular and scientific t e rm,  has come to  
have a variety of often overlapping definitions. As a starting point, consider the 
criteria proposed by Downs (1967; pp.24-25): 
1. a large organization (e .g . ,  where the h g h e s t  official knows less than 
half the employees), 
2, a majority of its members are full-time employees who depend on the 
organization for most of their income, 
3, initial hiring of personnel, their promotion and retention is based a t  
least partly on their performance in their organizational roles as 
opposed to, e .g . ,  family connections, religion, e t c . ,  or being elected to  
the position by some outside constituency, 
4. the major portion of its output is not directly or  indirectly evaluated in 
any competitive markets .  
I t  is this last characteristic w h c h  distinguishes bureaucracies from large profit- 
oriented organizations. Downs elaborates further: 
Unlike most other large organizations, bureaus are economi- 
cally one-faced ra ther  t h a n  two-faced. They face input mark- 
e ts  where they buy the scarce resources they need to pro- 
duce their outputs. But they face no economic markets  what- 
ever on the output side. Therefore, they have no d.irect .way 
of evaluating their outputs in relation to  the  costs of the 
inputs used to make them.  T h s  inability is of profound 
importance in all aspects  of bureaucratic behavior. . . .  
Thus, for all practical purposes, there is a complete separa- 
tion of each bureau's income from its expenditures. As a 
result ,  the bureau's  ability to obtain income in a market  can- 
not serve as an  objective guide to the desirability of extend- 
i rg,  maintaining, or contractin-g the level of expenditures i t  
undertakes. Nor c a n  it aid the bureau in determining how to 
use the resources i t  controls, or in appraising the perfor- 
mance of individual bureaucrats .  In short ,  the major yardst- 
icks for decisionrnaking used by private nonbureaucra t~c  
lirms are completely unavailable to men who run  bureaus. 
T h s  does not mean tha t  no tes ts  of efficiency whatsoever can 
be devised for bureaucratic behavior. Nor does it mean that 
the tools of economics cannot be fruitfully applied to the allo- 
cation of resources within bureaus. Nevertheless, the inabil- 
ity of bureaus to rely on markets as objective indicators of 
output value affects their entire operation. 
Following t h s  definition, nearly all government agencies qualify as bureau- 
cracies since few government services are sold in competitive markets. Also 
included are other non-profit organizations such as private foundations, educa- 
tional and religious institutions, provided they satisfy the other three criteria of 
large size, paid employment and evaluation of performance. Under this 
definition, bureaucracy is not only widespread but also increasing. In European 
in particular the increasing trend towards socialism is putting more more and 
more services under bureaucratic control--e.g. socialized medicine, social 
insurance, post, electronic communications, energy production, etc. Moreover, 
in the soviet countries, bureaucracy seems to have long since become an 
entrenched facet of the society; witness Trotsky's comment back in 1936: 
[According to the party program, the state as  a bureaucratic 
apparatus was to begin withering away on the very first day of 
proletarian dictatorship.] "This is what the Party program 
says: and it has still not been canceled. Strange: it sounds 
like a voice of a ghost from out of the 
mausoleum.. ..Bureaucracy has not only refused to disappear, 
as it could have done by entrusting its role to the masses, but 
is has become an uncontrolled power which dominates the 
people." from The R e v o l u t i o n  B e t r a y e d ,  quoted in Abrahams- 
son, 1977. p.46). 
Even in such supposed bastions of capitalism as the U.S,  bureaucracy 
appears to be steadily growing. Downs (1967, pp.32:34) cites a number of fac- 
tors. One is the case of consumer goods with large "external" costs or benefits. 
An external cost or benefit is one not reflected in good's free market price-for 
instance, the smog created by automobile exhaust, or non-biodegradable deter- 
gents whch  pollute rivers. The point is that  market mechanisms do not take 
these external costs Into account in selecting a n  equilibrium consumption level. 
To compensate for these inadequacies, a bureaucracy is often c rea ted  
Another case where a free marke t  mechanism does not operate  well is with 
so-called "collective goods." These a r e  goods with indivisible benefits; once the  
good exists, everyone benefits whether o r  not they have paid their  share .  An 
example is national defense. In a free marke t ,  each  person is motivated t o  avoid 
paying h is /her  pa r t ;  since everyone makes  this assumption, the collective good 
is not acquired. Again, to  avoid this pathology of the marke t  system, control of 
such  goods is given over to  a bureaucracy .  
A somewhat related situation arises in cer ta in  industries such a s  oil produc- 
tion or  telephone services where economies of scale or  patent  controls c r ea t e  
strong monopolistic tendencies.  In order  to  protect  the consumer from unfair 
pricing, two options have been  employed, both bureaucrat ic .  One, is to  national- 
ize the  ent i re  industry into a governmental agency. Examples a r e  PEMEX, 
Mexico's national oil company and the various PTT's in  European countries.  The 
other  alternative, effectively only slightly different, is t o  c rea te  a governmental 
regulatory agency t o  control the  monopoly's behavior, e .g . ,  the FTC and  FCC in 
t h e  U . S .  
Other motivations for the creat ion of bureaucracies  in  capitalist or social- 
ist countries a r e  such  common social functions as  poverty programs,  judicial 
systems and monitoring of the government itself. 
In a now classic s tudy,  the sociologist Max Weber (1956/1978), observed 
another  important  aspect  of bureaucracies .  To Weber, the  process of bureau- 
cratization is a shift from organizational management  based on the interests  
and personalities of specific individuals, t o  one based on  explicit r u l e s  and pro- 
cedures .  These rules and procedures  a r e  identified with r o l e s  in the organiza- 
tion r a the r  than  individual people. Bureaucratic orgamzations thus take  on a n  
~mpersonal ,  mechanical character.  To Weber, t h s  is a positive development 
leadlng to greater effectiveness and efficiency: 
Bclreaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is 
"dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds In ellmlnat- 
ing from official buslness love, hatred, and all purely per- 
sonal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calcu- 
lation [Weber 1956/ 1978:975]. 
Weber however also recognized that the very success of such a bureaucracy 
is one of its dangers--namely that  it becomes an immovable power in the society: 
Once fully established, bureaucracy is among those social 
s tructure w h c h  are hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the 
means of transforming social action into rationally organized 
action . . .  the ruled, for their part,  cannot dispense with or 
replace the bureaucratic apparatus once it exists, for it rests 
upon expert training, a functional specialization of work, and 
a n  attitude set on habitual virtuosity in the mastery of single 
yet methodically integrated functions.. . 
Such a n  apparatus makes "revolution," in the sense of force- 
ful creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and 
more impossible--technically, because of its control over the 
modern means of communication (telegraph, e t c . ) ,  and also 
because of its increasingly rationalized inner structure 
[Weber i956/ :978:987-9891. 
Weber's usage of "bureaucracy" is slightly different than the one introduced 
above; namely, it is a "rationalized" organization w h c h ,  presumably, may or 
may not compete in an  open market.  
However, it is generally observed that bureaucracies in the first, non- 
competitive sense tend to be even more rationalized and rule-bound than their 
competitive counterparts.  Michael Dempster (1980) suggested a possible expla- 
nation for  this. In a competitive environment, the organization is more likely to 
be put in situations where i t  must either change or die. The prescription of the 
organization's operations in terms of formal rules and procedures seems to be 
a t  odds with its ability to change. Thus, overly rule-bound organizations tend to 
be weeded out by a process of competitive selection 
Hureaucr.dcles, on the other hand, are (by the firs: definition) immune from 
lhis type of competitive threa t ,  and so their rules and procedures may perslst ,  
even to the point of ritualization. Thls presents  an interesting anomaly. Bureau- 
cracies presumably seek to rationalize their operations for  reasons of eficiency 
and uniformity of policy. However, this very effort a t  eficiency may, a f t e r  time, 
become a serious pathology of the  bureaucracy. 
Another suggestive point was also ralsed, namely tha t  formalization of 
operations and organizational adaptability s e e m  to  be confhcting principles. The 
key question is whether this is an  inherent property of systems of rules and pro- 
cedures per  se ,  or whether certain sociological factors involving the personali- 
ties in the  organization also play a par t .  This leads to  the second aspect of 
bureaucracies to be examined here ,  the bureaucrat.  
THE BUREAUCRATIC PERSONALITY 
Seldom are bureaucracies discussed without considering the role played by 
the people who staff them. Weber for instance remarks: 
the professional bureaucrat is chained to  his activity in his 
entire economic and ideological existence. In the  great  
majority of cases he is only a small cog in a ceaselessly mov- 
ing mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed 
routine of march [Weber 1956/ 1978:988]. 
A bureaucrat ,  unlike many other vocations, is heavi.1~ socialized and hence 
psychologically dependent on his/her  active role in the organization. Bureau- 
cracies such as have been described generally only arise in large organizations 
and then usually only a fairly long period of adjustment and stabilization. Thus 
the  activities of a bu.reaucrat are not only explicitly prescribed, but their full 
extent and interplay with other parts  of the  organization is also complex and 
diEcult to learn. The bureaucrat  therefore becomes an expert in hls /her  role in 
the part icular  organization. This 1s for instance qulte different from profession- 
als or t rade  workers whose specialities a r e  generally transferable t o  o ther  
organizations 
A bureaucra t ' s  training is thus pecullar t o  h s l h e r  organization; which 
makes it u n s u r p r i s i x  t ha t  these people cling tenaciously to their  positions, 
building defenses and  guarding informational resources to  make  their  positions 
more secure .  
This, I think, is one of the primarily reasons why bureaucracies a r e  so per- 
sistent.  Indeed, they survive even national revolutions. For instance, speaking 
about t h e  post-revolutionary period in Russia, Lenin complained: 
[During the revolutionary upheavals, the  bureaucrats  f rom 
the Tsaristic t ime had been shaken up and  placed in new 
posts. But they did not remain there .  They tried to regain 
their old positions.] The Tsarist bureaucrats  began t o  en t e r  
the  Soviet institutions and pract ice their  bureaucratic 
methods,  they began to  assume the  coloring of communists 
and,  for grea te r  success in their  careers ,  t o  procure member-  
s h p  cards of t he  Russian Communist Party.  And so, having 
been thrown out of the  door,  they  fly in through the  window! 
(Lenin, Selected Works, Vol VIII:353, quoted in [Abrahamsson 
1977: 41 -421). 
Another important  aspec t  concerning the  motivations of bureaucrats  t o  
hold onto their  positions was brought out  by Trotsky, again based on observa- 
tions of the Soviet governmental bureaucracy:  
Bureaucracy owns neither shares  nor  s ta te  bonds. It  is 
recrui ted,  replenished, and renewed a s  a n  administrative 
herarch j r ,  independently of property relationships. The indi- 
vidual bureaucrat  cannot transfer t he  right to exploit the 
s ta te  apparatus  t o  his heirs. Bureaucracy enjoys its 
priklleges in  the form of power abuse (Trotsky, The Revolut-ion 
Betrayed,  pp. 179-iRO; quoted in Abrahamsson, 1977:46). 
T h s  last  observation is interesting in  light of t he  r emarks  by Weber earlier 
Weber views the process of bureaucratization a s  tending towards operations 
based on impartial  rules and procedures  ra ther  than  personalities and personal 
motives 
But, as the Trotksy quote suggests, one of the pathologies of mature 
bureaucracies is practically the reverse. Because bureaucrats become so wed- 
ded to their roles, they not only depend on them psychologically bat also tend to 
re-interpret them to satisfy their own personal ends. Portugal, a s i tua t~on I
know to some degree personally, is another example of a large government 
bureaucracy which survived a national revolution. There the above mentioned 
pathology of bureaucracy e17en has a name: "cunha" ('coon-ya'). Cunha is the 
informal system for getting things done in the bureaucracy based on who you 
know, trading of favors, e tc .  In Portugal, and I suspect elsewhere, it is amaz- 
ingly well developed and in many cases effectively invalidates the formal rule 
structure.  
I am sure similar informal systems exist in other large bureaucracies to a 
greater  or lesser degree. 
I point t h s  out because such "cunha" systems may in certain cases be the  
real barrier to improvement of the bureaucracy. The fundamental difficulty of 
this is that because it consists for the most part  of quasi- or illegal actions on 
the  par t  of its participants- hence a source of potential embarrassment-i t  is 
generally kept secret.  
INFORMATION TECHNO1,OGY IN BUREAUCRACIES 
Bureaucrats are no longer the only active force in bureaucracies. Whereas 
a bureaucrat is trained and socialized to follow prescribed procedures, a com- 
puter can likewise be program.med to follow many of these same procedures. 
Indeed, the computerization of a bureaucratic process is the ulti.mate form 
of organizational rationalizat~on. The computer is the archetype of Neber's 
dictum to eliminate "love, haired and all purely personal, irrational and emo- 
tionid elements" from the organization's procedures. 
Yet while computers presumably help remove the undesirabie caprice of 
Gul-eaucrats themselves, they nonetheless have become symbols of pathological 
bureaucratic rigidity. We are all acquainted with the agonies of trying to  rectify 
a computer based billing error,  etc. 
But is this really because the computerization of such process actually 
makes them less adaptive, or is it rather that  computers provide a convenient 
scapegoat for organizational incompetefice? Systems analysts will often argue 
that the latter is the case. While I t h n k  thts is to some extent true, it is as well 
true that  computerization, at  least in its most prevalent forms, does add to 
inflexibility. Thts stems from two interrelated problems. 
The first is one of organizational responsibility: The people that  use the  
computer programs are very seldom the ones that  write them. Thus the people 
that  are close to the problem and able to recognize needed modifications as 
they arise, must request the assistance of a programmer, who typically resides 
in a different (data processmg) department. This problem has been widely 
recognized and is often cited as a motivation for localized (microprocessor) 
computing and associated high level languages that the functional departments 
themselves can control; see e.g., Fick (1980). 
However, t h s  is likely to be only a partial solution, applicable only to those 
procedures that  are modular and separable to individual departments. The 
problem still would remain as to the management of procedures that pervade 
large segments of the organization, especially where these are complex and 
interdependent. 
The second source of inflexibility arising from computerization arises, I con- 
tend, from the character of the computer languages used to describe these 
procedures. The basic problem 1s that current programming p r ac t~ce  forces 
logical deslgns whose pieces are highly interdependent. 
W~nograd (: 979) for instance observes 
Using current programming techniques, systems often reach 
a point a t  whch the accretion of changes makes  their struc- 
ture  so baroque and opaque that  further changes are ~mpossi- 
ble, and the performance of the system is irreversibly 
degraded. 
The resistance of computer based information systems to  subsequent 
modification is one aspect of the current "software crisis" gaining increased 
attention in the computer science literature. 
One way of viewing t h s  problem is as a trade-off between "procedural" vs 
"declarative" representations of knowledge (see Lee 1980, for more detail). 
Briefly, procedural design makes use of a rigidly controlled sequence of steps, 
each of which defines a narrow context of focus and therefore can make use of 
specialized rules of interpretation. Declarative representations, on the other 
hand, at tempt to avoid such sequential dependence and seek to develop general 
rules of interpretation. This latter approach is conceptually much more difficult 
but, once achieved, offers much greater flexibility for further modifications. 
Another advantage of t h s  type of software a rch tec tu re  is that  i t  allows the 
specification of so-called "heuristics," i .e . ,  rules that  may not work in all cases. 
Thus. for instance, a computer program confronted with a particular problem 
may try to  resolve it using one set  of heuristic rules; if those do not work, other 
rules are tried, etc.  
Example applications of programs of this sort have been chess playing pro- 
grams, programs to  find mathematical proofs, etc. 
In such systems, there may in fact be multiple ways to solve a given prob- 
lem (or none at  all); and it is the job of the program to find a satisfactory solu- 
tron as quickly as possible. Because the program must search through a 
number of potentially ieasible alternatives for each problem, rather than having 
a single solution technique pre-selected, these systems are  considerably less 
efficient, though correspondingly more flexible in dealing with highly varied 
situations. 
The trade-off between procedural vs. declarative designs for programming 
languages is as yet still a n  issue for research, and i t  will be some time before 
computer languages supporting declarative rule representations come into com- 
mercial use. 
Beyond these technical issues, however, the similarity between the resis- 
tance to change in large computer systems and large scale bureaucracies is, in 
itself provocative. What I want to suggest is that not only do computers offer a 
new medium for representing bureaucratic rules and procedures, but also as 
mechanical systems based on rules and procedures, the issues in programming 
language a rch tec tu re  offer a useful model  for considering the problems of 
bureaucracies. That is, the  issues currently under study tor the design of com- 
puter programs might offer a new interpretation of the problems in designing 
bureaucratic rules and procedures, quite apart  from computer implementa- 
tions. 
The suggestion here is that  an  analogous procedural/declarative trade-off 
exists for the design of bureaucratic procedures. The organization becomes 
more efficient, the more its operations become proceduralized. However, to be 
flexible, these rules must be in a form that they may be easily examined and 
modified without affecting other aspects of the bureaucracy's operations. 
Furthermore, the flexibility of a given bureaucratic policy might be enhanced by 
regarding it as a sort of heuristics for accomplishing a certain goal, ra ther  than 
as a single deterministic rule. T h s  is implicit in the so-called "management by 
objectives" approach to administration: instructions to subordinates are given 
in the form of goals to be attained rather than procedures. The employees are 
then given the freedom to devise their own mans for reaching these ends. 
The value of computer language representations as a model for the study of 
bureaucracies is at  t h s  stage only conjectural. The comparison does however 
help to isolate one important facet of bureaucratic design, namely the structure 
of the bureaucracy's rule system. This aspect is generally submerged amidst 
the many inter-personal and political factors that  operate in bureaucracies. 
SUMMARY 
Bureaucracies were viewed as large organizations lacking competitive pres- 
sures and performance incentives. They are economically one-sided with 
measurable inputs and largely non-measurable outputs. They have a tendency 
towards increased rationalization and formalization of their operations that  is 
seldom if ever reversed by shocks from the market place. 
Bureaucrats are  employees bred into these organizations. They have 
become socialized into its rules and procedures and have a personal interest in 
its continued stability. This is a major factor contributing to  the reluctance and 
inability of bureaucracies to adapt to new circumstances. 
Information technology, as currently applied, tends to further re-inforce 
the tendency to stability, indeed, rigidity of the bureaucratic rule system. 
Bureaucracies, then, have multiple factors contributing to their stable con- 
tinuance and resistance to change. Sometimes, when a bureaucracy's service 
becomes so outmoded as to have doubtful social benefit, it is successfully abol- 
ished or reduced by a budget cut.  The more serious problem is, however, with 
bureaucracies that  control an obviously necessary social function (e.g. ,  postal 
service, army), bu t  fail to improve or adapt their services to changing needs. 
They continue on as before, often despite efforts by elected leaders to change 
them. (\Vitness how many campaigmng politicians promise to trim the bureau- 
cratic fat,  and how few actually succeed.) 
The central research issue is whether an  alternative design for bureaucra- 
cies can be found which does not lead to irreversible rigidity. The suggestion 
here was that  certain representation issues in the design of computer languages 
may provide new insights. In particular was the possibility of representing the 
bureaucracy's policy in the form of independent, declarative rules which can be 
analyzed and modified gradually, rather  than requiring a complete reorganiza- 
tion. 
REFERENCES 
Abrahamsson, Bengt. 1977. B u ~ e a u c ~ a c y  OT Pa~t ic ipat ion:  The Logic of Organi- 
zation. London: Sage Publications. 
Crozier, Michel. 1964. The B u r e a u c ~ a t i c  Phenomenon. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Dempster, Michael. 1980. Personal conversation, IIASA. 
Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucray. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 
Fick, Goeran P. 1980. "Small Computers in Organizations: Issues and Argu- 
ments -- or -- How to Fight with Computer-Enhanced Bureaucracy," 
IIASA, WP-80-146. 
Gailbraith, Jay. 1973. Designing Complez Organizations. Reading, Mass. 
Addison-Wesley Publications. 
Lee, Ronald. 1980. "Applications Software and Organizat.iona1 Change: Issues in 
the Representation of Knowledge," II.ASA, MTP-80-1 8 2 .  
Sproull, Lee, Stephen Weiner, and David Wolf. 1973. Organizing a n  A n a ~ c h y .  
Chlcago: University of Chicago Press. 
Weber, Xax. 1956/:973. Economy and Society Berkeley, California: University 
of California Press,  translated from Wirtschaft  u n d  Gesellschaft ,  Tue- 
bingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1956. 
Winograd, Terry. 1979. "Beyond Programming Languages," Communicat ions  of 
t h e  ACM, July 1979, Vol. 22, No. 7:391-401. 
